The following is a list of Game Play Items that are new to DMB 7.0 and explanations on how they effect game play.....these are text files were taken from the DMB 7.0 disk
Pitchouts
Overview
--------
Version 7 gives you the opportunity to call for a pitchout anytime there
are fewer than three balls on the hitter. This provides a good way for you
to defend against the stolen base, hit and run, and squeeze bunts.
Most, if not all, baseball simulation games have stacked the deck in favor
of the offensive manager in these situations. When up against a manager
who liked to run a great deal, there was nothing the defensive manager
could do except sit back and hope that the catcher would throw someone out
every once in a while. Now the defense can fight back.
Computer Manager
----------------
If the computer manager is handling the defense, you can expect it to pitch
out with the same frequency as real-life teams do. We have studied pitch-
by-pitch data from thousands of big league games to learn how often
pitchouts are made in stealing and hit and run situations:
- with runners of varying ability (the more frequent stealers attract
more pitchouts)
- on different counts (less often with two strikes on the hitter)
- with varying game situations (less often in blowouts, when the threat
and importance of a stolen base are much lower)
A similar set of variables controls how often the defense pitches out to
defend against the squeeze bunt.
You can count on the computer manager to pitch out at the same rates and in
the same situations as their real-life counterparts. And if you are
setting up a manager profile to handle your team, a new manager tendency
lets you choose how aggressively to pitch out.
Pitchout results
----------------
Naturally, we have also studied the results of pitchouts. We know how much
stolen base success rate goes down on a pitchout. All of these frequencies
have been carefully designed into the pitchout system in the game.
As with pickoff throws by pitchers, our studies indicate that real-life
managers are highly rational in their use of pitchouts. We measured the
value of the good things that can happen (caught stealing) and the cost of
the bad things (getting behind in the count) in terms of the average number
of runs scored in various situations. And the benefits and risks balance
out very nicely.
Obviously, there is no incentive to pitch out all the time, because your
pitchers will be behind in the count too often. And there is no incentive
to avoid pitching out altogether, because you will give up too many stolen
bases if you never pitch out. The risks and rewards should push you toward
pitching out at about the same rate, and in the same situations, as real-
life managers do.
Of course, this equilibrium exists only if you are playing against an
offensive manager who behaves like real-life managers do. If you are
playing against an opponent who has fallen into a somewhat predictable
pattern, you can take advantage of that knowledge to gain a competitive
edge.
As with the pitcher pickoff throw, outguessing the offensive manager does
not guarantee an out. Your chances of throwing out a runner are definitely
better on a pitchout than on a normal pitch, but the reduction in steal
percentage is only about half of what it is when you catch a runner leaning
on a pickoff throw. So there is still a decent chance that the runner will
successfully steal the base on a pitchout.
If you pitch out on a hit and run play, the batter may try to reach over
the plate to get a piece of the ball even if the defense pitches out. He
will not be successful very often, but every once in a while, he will break
up the play by fouling the pitch off or putting the ball in play.
If you are fortunate enough to catch the offense on a suicide squeeze bunt,
you will almost always be rewarded with an out.
User Interface -------------- Version 7 gives you the opportunity to make pickoff throws to any base by choosing option 5 on the pitching tactics menu. If there is only one runner on base, the game knows that you want to throw to that base. If there two or more runners on base, you have two ways to select which base to throw to. If you press the 5 key to choose a pickoff throw, the game presents a list of bases to choose from. Pressing 1, 2 or 3 selects the base. The game will not allow you to make a pickoff throw to an unoccupied base. This method makes it obvious to anyone looking at the screen that you have chosen this tactic, so you do not want to use this method when you are playing against a human opponent, either face-to-face or over the Internet. To preserve the element of surprise, the game offers you alternative keystrokes for making pickoff throws. If you press 1, 2 or 3 while holding down the Shift key, the game will make a pickoff throw to first, second or third, respectively. This gives you a way to make a pickoff throw to a specific base without providing your opponent with any indication that you plan to do this. Computer Manager ---------------- It does not matter which option you choose when you are playing against the computer manager. We have designed the computer manager so that it does not know what tactics the defense has chosen when it is deciding whether to bunt, steal, or use the hit and run. As a result, the computer manager is as vulnerable to having runners picked off as any good human manager. If the computer manager is handling the defense, you can expect it to make pickoff throws with the same frequency as real-life teams do. We have studied pitch-by-pitch data from thousands of big league games to learn how often pickoff throws are made: - with runners of varying ability (the more frequent stealers attract more throws) - on different counts (less often with two strikes on the hitter or on 3-0 counts) - to each base with more than one runner on (with runners on first and second, managers go after the lead runner more often, but sometimes try to catch the runner on first napping) - with varying game situations (less often in blowouts, when the threat and importance of a stolen base are much lower) You can count on the computer manager to make pickoff throw attempts at the same rates and in the same situations as their real-life counterparts. And if you are setting up a manager profile to handle your team, a new manager tendency lets you choose how aggressively to make pickoff throws. Pickoff throw results --------------------- We have also studied the results of pickoff throws. We know how often pitchers balk when making pickoff throws. We know how often pickoff throws result in errors charged to the pitcher or the fielder at the base. We know how often runners return to their base and how often they get back safely. We know how often they break for the next base and how much their stolen base success rate goes down when they do. All of these frequencies have been carefully designed into the pickoff system in the game. Our studies indicate that real-life managers are highly rational in their use of pitcher pickoff throws. We measured the value of the good things that can happen (gaining an out via a pickoff or caught stealing) and the cost of the bad things (extra bases given on balks, errors, successful steals) in terms of the average number of runs scored in various situations. And the benefits and risks balance out very nicely. In other words, there is no incentive to keep throwing over all the time, because you will eventually get burned. And there is no incentive to avoid throwing over altogether, because you will give up the opportunity to make some crucial outs. The risks and rewards should push you toward throwing over at about the same rate, and in the same situations, as real-life managers do. Of course, this is only true if you are playing against an offensive manager who behaves like real-life managers do. If you are playing against a human opponent who has fallen into a somewhat predictable pattern, you can take advantage of that knowledge to gain a competitive edge. Version 7 gives you the opportunity to play cat-and-mouse with the offensive manager. But, just as in real life, outguessing the offensive manager does not guarantee an out. If the runner has the steal sign, and you make a pickoff throw, your pitcher could still balk or throw the ball away. And the runner might still get back safely. After all, real-life runners do not always break for second at the first motion of the pitcher. They usually study the pitcher to see whether he is going home or throwing over. And they are often able to read the pitcher and get back safely. The real-life data tell us that the vast majority of pickoff throws are non-events. Only about one in every 40 pickoff throws results in a balk, pickoff, error, or stolen base. So, we repeat, even if you outguess the offensive manager, there is no guarantee that you will get an out on the play. But your chances of picking off a runner are much greater if he has the steal sign, the hit and run is on, or you are throwing to third when the offense has called for a squeeze play. Baseball is a game of small advantages, and if you conistently outsmarts your opponent, those small gains will add up to more wins. Even if the offensive manager is not sending the runner on the play, there is still a small chance that he will get picked off. It will just happen a lot less often. Your chances of picking off a runner also depend on the hold rating of the pitcher. Naturally, the better the pitcher is at holding runners, the more likely he will be to notch a few pickoffs over the course of a season. You can make a pickoff throw to first even if the first baseman is not holding the runner. This is a timing play that is similar to pickoff throws at second base. The fielder tries to slip in behind the runner and catch him napping, with the pitcher throwing the ball to a spot and counting on the fielder getting there on time. As you would expect, both the risks and rewards are higher. You have a better chance of picking the runner off, but the error rate goes up, too.
Many of you already know that the sacrifice rule has changed many times
in the history of professional baseball. Here are the changes that have
occurred during the 20th century:
- from 1900 to 1907, sacrifice flies were not counted
- from 1908 to 1925, a batter who hit a fly ball that scored a runner from
third was credited with a sacrifice, but these sacrifices were grouped
together with sacrifice bunts in one category called sacrifice hits (SH)
- from 1926 to 1930, batters were awarded a sacrifice if any runner
advanced on a fly ball, and sacrifice bunts and flies continued to be
grouped together in the SH category
- from 1931 to 1938, sacrifices were no longer awarded on any fly balls
- in 1939, sacrifices were once again credited on fly balls that scored
a runner, but they were still combined with bunts
- from 1940 to 1953, sacrifice flies were once again eliminated
- from 1954 to the present, batters were once again awarded sacrifices
on scoring fly balls, and a new category (sacrifice flies, or SF) was
created to keep them separate from sacrifice bunts
Starting with version 7, Diamond Mind Baseball enables you to choose the
sacrifice fly rule for a league. The conversion program automatically
assigns a sacrifice fly rule based on the year of the Era the league is
currently assigned to. To double-check that the correct rule was
assigned by the conversion, or to change the rule for a league, choose
Organize/League/Modify and select from one of the following values:
"None" for no sacrifice flies
"3rd only, as SH" to credit a SH on a scoring fly ball
"3rd only, as SF" to credit a SF on a scoring fly ball
"Any base, as SH" to credit a SH on any fly ball that advances
a runner
It should be clear that the generous rule in the 1926-30 period inflated
batting averages by quite a few points relative to eras when sacrifices
were awarded only on scoring fly balls or not at all. Previous versions
of Diamond Mind Baseball always used the modern rule, and that made it
more difficult to compare your Diamond Mind results with real life.
With the ability to choose the appropriate sacrifice fly rule for your
league, that becomes much easier.
Version 7 adds a disabled list (DL) feature that is designed to help
leagues that allow managers to place injured players on the DL to
free up a spot on the 25- or 40-man roster.
To place a player on the DL, choose Organize/Roster to access the player's
roster, then choose Transaction/DL to place him on the DL. The game will
not allow you to place someone on the DL if he is not currently injured.
If he is injured, you have the option to make the move retroactive to the
day he was injured or the day after his last appearance in a game,
whichever is later. If the player's injury was for less than 15 days,
the length of the injury may be increased if necessary to ensure that he
will not be available until 15 days after the effective date of the DL
move. Use Transaction/Activate to restore a player to the active roster.
When you place a player on the DL, he keeps his place in the manager
profile, but the computer manager will not use him. In previous versions,
the only way to free up a roster spot was to demote a player to the
reserve roster, a move that deleted the player from the manager profile,
forcing you to manually restore his roles when he was later promoted.
The new DL feature eliminates the need for this type of bookkeeping.
You may be aware that modern real-life teams work with two disabled lists,
the 15-day DL and the 60-day DL. After researching the real-life system,
we concluded that the rules surrounding the 60-day DL involved various
legal and contractual factors that are not relevant in our game. So the
Diamond Mind Baseball DL is a 15-day DL with no limit on the number of
players who can be on the list at one time.
You can use the DL feature to simulate real-life disabled list moves, but
be aware that another feature, the automated transaction log, is better
suited for that purpose. The automated transaction log is described in
another note, but briefly, its role is to enable you to enter real-life
roster moves, save them permanently, and have them automatically carried
out on the specified day as you conduct a detailed replay a real-life
season. With the automated transaction log, you can replay the same
season many times, knowing that the real-life transactions will be
applied the same way each time.
Each Diamond Mind Baseball player has an error rating for each position
at which he played enough to get a range rating. These error ratings are
expressed as a percentage of the league average, though without the
decimal point. If a player made errors at the same rate as the average
player at his position, his rating is 100, or 100% of the average. If
he made half as many errors, his rating is 50 (i.e. 50%).
The ratings are designed this way to make it possible to play meaningful
games among teams from different eras. In the early part of this century,
it was common for shortstops to make fifty errors in a season. Today,
half that many might lead the league. We capture the changes in error
rates in the Era record, and use that rate as the baseline for generating
errors in the game.
For example, the average 1905 shortstop made 50 errors per 100 complete
games played (900 defensive innings). So a shortstop who played 100
complete games and made 40 errors is assigned a rating of 40/50 = 80%.
If that shortstop played 100 games for a 1995 team, when the average
shortstop made 15 errors per 100 games played, he would be expected to
make 15 * 80% = 12 errors per 100 full games. If he played 150 games,
he'd be expected to make 12 * 150 / 100 = 18 errors.
We chose 100 games (instead of 154 or 162) as the playing time standard
for a number of reasons. Season lengths have changed over time, from
140 games at the turn of the century, to 126 games during World War I,
to 115 games in the strike year of 1994, and the norms of 154 and 162
that we're used to for most years. Furthermore, most players don't play
every inning of every game, so using 162 full games would inflate the
numbers beyond what we're used to seeing for a full season. Besides,
100 is a nice round number that's easy to work with.
A player's error rate shows up in the game in three places. If you are
using the player creation or modification features, you'll see the error
rates expressed as percentages. These are the values that determine
player performance.
On the game screen and the team status report, however, error ratings
are converted to the 100-game interval to make them a little easier to
understand. We think it's easier to grasp the information when it
reads e14 -- meaning that the player can be expected to make 14 errors
per 100 games -- than when it reads 117 (17% more errors than the norm).
If you're deciding who to play, and one has a rating of e12 and the
other is e19, you know the difference will be about 7 errors per 100
games.
Of course, the player's actual error rate depends on the era he's
playing in. If you change the era for a league, the error rates that
are displayed in e99 form will change accordingly.
Diamond Mind Baseball offers you a full array of bunting options. As
the offensive manager, you can choose different types of bunts for
different situations. As the defensive manager, you can call for a
pitchout in the hope of catching a runner on third too far from the
base. And you can play the infield in at the corners to reduce the
chances that the hitter can bunt successfully.
The outcome of a bunt play depends on (a) the batter's bunt rating,
(b) the range and error ratings of the fielder who plays the ball,
and (c) whether the fielder was playing in.
Bunt Ratings
------------
Beginning with version 7, Diamond Mind Baseball assigns two bunt
ratings to each player. One reflects his ability to bunt for a hit
and the other his ability to lay down a successful sacrifice or
squeeze bunt. This split is necessary because there are many players
who are extremely good at sacrificing but are really no threat to
bunt for a hit. And there are others who can use their speed and
bat control to bunt for a hit 40-50% of the time, but who have only
average results in sacrifice and squeeze situations. On the game
screen, you'll see the appropriate bunt rating on the screen based
on the location of the runners, if any, and the number of outs.
Bunting for a Hit
-----------------
With the bases empty or two out, you can try to bunt for a hit, hoping
to catch the defense napping. You'll find that the computer manager
will almost always bring the corners in when and Ex or Vg bunter comes
up in these situations. That's because there are players (Lofton, Nixon,
Fonville in 1996) who consistently bat .400 or better (sometimes as high
as .600) when attempting to bunt for a hit. Real-life defenses always
try to take this option away by playing in at the corners.
On some bunt attempts, the hitter pulls the bat back and takes the pitch
because he thinks it is out of the strike zone. Sometimes he'll be right,
and sometimes the umpire will call a strike. And, because the batters is
trying to get a quick jump out of the batter's box, many of these attempts
are fouled off. If you bunt for a hit too much, you may well find your
hitters falling behind in the count and reducing their effectiveness when
swinging away.
Suicide Squeeze Bunts
---------------------
With a runner on third and less than two out, you can use the suicide
squeeze bunt. On this play, the runner breaks for home as soon as the
pitcher begins his motion toward the plate. This gives the offensive
team the best chance to score the run, because the early jump makes it
almost impossible for the defense to make a play at home if the batter
can get the ball in play.
Real-life players are successful on the squeeze play over 75% of the
time, provided they get the ball in play. That's partly because most
managers attempt the squeeze only when the situation favors them -- a
skilled bunter at the plate, below average fielders, and/or the
infielders playing back. You won't achieve the same result if you bunt
too often in situations that are less favorable. And you'll see a lower
success rate if the bases are loaded, because the defense can make a
force at home instead of having to tag the runner.
There are, of course, several reasons why the squeeze bunt is a dangerous
tactic. If the defense pitches out or the batter misses the pitch, the
runner on third is a sitting duck. And many squeeze bunt attempts are
fouled off, putting the batter behind in the count and making him much
less of a threat to drive the runner in from third some other way. The
batter will never take a pitch with the runner breaking from third, so you
won't see any balls or called strikes in these situations.
Safety Squeeze
--------------
This is similar to the Suicide Squeeze, except that the runner holds his
position at third until he sees the batter put the ball in play. This
means that the runner will be safe if the defense pitches out or the batter
takes a pitch or misses a bunt attempt. But it also means that it will take
a much better bunt to score the runner from third.
With Runners at First and Third
-------------------------------
If there are runners on first and third, you can choose to have the runner
hold at third. The objective here is to bunt the runner over to second from
first, thereby putting two runners in scoring position and staying out of the
double play.
If the batter is successful in putting the ball in play, the defense will
usually try to make the out at first. Throwing to second to force the
runner would freuqently give the runner at third time to score.
Sacrifice Bunts
---------------
Most bunt attempts are sacrifices with a runner at first or runners at first
and second. In these cases, the runner or runners wait for contact to be
made before breaking for the next base. The defense may attempt to retire
the lead runner if the bunt is not a good one.
Real-life players are successful on sacrifice attempts over 80% of the time,
provided they get the ball in play. You might think this tactic would be
used much more often because it is successful such a high percentage of the
time.
But a successful sacrifice does not necessarily help you score more runs.
The offense gives up an out (most of the time), and that significantly
reduces the odds of a big inning. And it doesn't increase the chance to
score one or two runs very much.
There are risks, of course. The batter might bunt into a double play. The
batter may foul off one or two attempts and fall behind in the count. But
the risks are not great. The main reason we don't see more sacrifice bunts
is that the rewards are not all that great either.
Overview -------- In version 6.5, we added catcher pickoff throws and all of the associated types of plays (runner back safely, runner picked off, runner out advancing, runner out in rundown, runner safe after rundown, runner safe on an error). These throws are made with the same frequency as in real-life and result in a realistic number of pickoffs, errors and other outcomes. Our research indicates that catchers rarely try to pick runners off when they are leading by four or more runs or when an errant throw could produce the tying run. They are more common for teams that are behind and need a momentum-turning play. So you'll find that your Diamond Mind catchers behave in a similar fashion. Of course, you'll also find that the best throwing catchers have a much better chance of getting a pickoff, while the worst will not even try pickoff throws very often. In version 7, we have enhanced the logic behind catcher pickoff throws to reflect the addition of the pitch-by-pitch simulation model. The main difference is that certain pitch results (blocking a pitch in the dirt, for example) do not permit the catcher to make a throw. Unlike pickoff throws by pitchers, you cannot choose to make a catcher pickoff throw. When we started work on version 7, we planned to give you the option to have your catcher make a pickoff throw, but we discovered that it would be a bad idea. If you have read our note about pickoff throws by pitchers, you already know that our studies show a natural equilibrium. The risks and rewards are perfectly balanced, so there is no incentive to throw over all the time or not at all. As a result, it makes sense to give you the option to make a pickoff throw whenever you want, because overuse and underuse of the tactic are equally ineffective. Catcher pickoff throws are different. Very few catcher pickoff throws are made in real life. In the 1996 American League, catchers threw to a base only about once per 380 pitches. And that excludes pitches that were fouled off, put in play, or were blocked in the dirt. Ivan Rodriguez is clearly regarded as the top pickoff threat in the league, and even he threw to a base only once every two to three games. Furthermore, the rewards appear to be much greater than the risks. Successful pickoffs outnumber throwing errors by a good margin. And an out saves a lot more runs than a throwing error costs you. As a result, there is a strong incentive to throw at every opportunity. So why do we see so few attempts if the odds favor the catcher? We believe the opportunities are, in fact, quite limited. For example, after a spring training game in 1997, Rodriguez was quoted as saying that they decided to try to pick off a certain Toronto runner if he continued to stray too far from the bag. The key point here, we believe, is that even the best throwing catcher in the game had to wait for the runner to present the opportunity through carelessness. If we gave you the option to call for a catcher pickoff throw, while leaving the rates of pickoffs and throwing errors as they are in real life, you would have every incentive to use the tactic way too often. To bring the incentives back into balance, we would have to generate fewer pickoffs and/or many more throwing errors. And, as we discussed earlier, real-life managers do not really have the option to call for a catcher pickoff throw any time they want, because in most situations, the runner is careful enough to eliminate any chance of a pickoff. So Diamond Mind Baseball will continue to generate catcher pickoff throws based on game situations and catcher throwing ratings, with the outcomes of these plays based on real-life results.